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Abstract
Printed and digitally displayed photos have the ability to
hide imperceptible digital data that can be accessed through
internet-connected imaging systems. Another way to think
about this is physical photographs that have unique QR
codes invisibly embedded within them. This paper presents
an architecture, algorithms, and a prototype implementation
addressing this vision. Our key technical contribution is Ste-
gaStamp, a learned steganographic algorithm to enable ro-
bust encoding and decoding of arbitrary hyperlink bitstrings
into photos in a manner that approaches perceptual invisibil-
ity. StegaStamp comprises a deep neural network that learns
an encoding/decoding algorithm robust to image perturba-
tions approximating the space of distortions resulting from
real printing and photography. We demonstrates real-time
decoding of hyperlinks in photos from in-the-wild videos that
contain variation in lighting, shadows, perspective, occlu-
sion and viewing distance. Our prototype system robustly
retrieves 56 bit hyperlinks after error correction – sufficient
to embed a unique code within every photo on the internet.
Code is available at https://github.com/tancik/StegaStamp.
1. Introduction
Our vision is a future in which each photo in the real
world invisibly encodes a unique hyperlink to arbitrary infor-
mation. This information is accessed by pointing a camera
at the photo and using the system described in this paper to
decode and follow the hyperlink. In the future, augmented-
reality (AR) systems may perform this task continuously,
visually overlaying retrieved information alongside each
photo in the user’s view.
Our approach is related to the ubiquitous QR code and
similar technologies, which are now commonplace for a wide
variety of data-transfer tasks, such as sharing web addresses,
purchasing goods, and tracking inventory. Our approach can
be thought of as a complementary solution that avoids visible,
ugly barcodes, and enables digital information to be invisibly
∗Authors contributed equally to this work.
and ambiently embedded into the ubiquitous imagery of the
modern visual world.
It is worth taking a moment to consider three potential
use cases of our system. First, at the farmer’s market, a stand
owner may add photos of each type of produce alongside
the price, encoded with extra information for customers
about the source farm, nutrition information, recipes, and
seasonable availability. Second, in the lobby of a university
department, a photo directory of faculty may be augmented
by encoding a unique URL for each person’s photo that
contains the professor’s webpage, office hours, location, and
directions. Third, New York City’s Times Square is plastered
with digital billboards. Each image frame displayed may be
encoded with a URL containing further information about
the products, company, and promotional deals.
Figure 1 presents an overview of our system, which we
call StegaStamp, in the context of a typical usage flow. The
inputs are an image and a desired hyperlink. First, we assign
the hyperlink a unique bit string (analogous to the process
used by URL-shortening services such as tinyurl.com). Sec-
ond, we use our StegaStamp encoder to embed the bit string
into the target image. This produces an encoded image that
is ideally perceptually identical to the input image. As de-
scribed in detail in Section 4, our encoder is implemented
as a deep neural network jointly trained with a second net-
work that implements decoding. Third, the encoded image is
physically printed (or shown on an electronic display) and
presented in the real world. Fourth, a user takes a photo that
contains the physical print. Fifth, the system uses an image
detector to identify and crop out all images. Sixth, each im-
age is processed with the StegaStamp decoder to retrieve the
unique bitstring, which is used to follow the hyperlink and
retrieve the information associated with the image.
This method of data transmission has a long history in
both the steganography and watermarking literatures. We
present the first end-to-end trained deep pipeline for this
problem that can achieve robust decoding even under “phys-
ical transmission,” delivering excellent performance suffi-
cient to encode and retrieve arbitrary hyperlinks for an essen-
tially limitless number of images. We extend the traditional
learned steganography framework by adding a set of differ-
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Figure 1: Our deep learning system is trained to hide hyperlinks in images. First, an encoder network processes the input image
and hyperlink bitstring into a StegaStamp (encoded image). The StegaStamp is then printed and captured by a camera. A
detection network localizes and rectifies the StegaStamp before passing it to the decoder network. After the bits are recovered
and error corrected, the user can follow the hyperlink. To train the encoder and decoder networks, we simulate the corruptions
caused by printing, reimaging, and detecting the StegaStamp with a set of differentiable image augmentations.
entiable pixelwise and spatial image corruptions between
the encoder and decoder that successfully approximate the
space of distortions resulting from “physical transmission”
(i.e., real printing or display and subsequent image capture).
The result is robust retrieval of 95% of 100 encoded bits in
real-world conditions while preserving excellent perceptual
image quality. This allows our prototype to uniquely encode
hidden hyperlinks for orders of magnitude more images than
exist on the internet today (upper bounded by 100 trillion).
2. Related Work
2.1. Steganography
Steganography is the act of hiding data within other data
and has a long history that can be traced back to ancient
Greece. Our proposed task is a type of steganography where
we hide a code within an image. Various methods have been
developed for digital image steganography. Data can be hid-
den in the least significant bits of the image, subtle color
variations, and subtle luminosity variations. Often methods
are designed to evade steganalysis, the detection of hidden
messages [18, 34]. We refer the interested reader to sur-
veys [9, 11] that review a wide set of techniques.
The most relevant work to our proposal are methods that
utilize deep learning to both encode and decode a mes-
sage hidden inside an image [5, 21, 43, 47, 51, 54, 44].
Our method assumes that the image will be corrupted by
a display-imaging pipeline between the encoding and de-
coding steps. With the exception of HiDDeN [54] and Light
Field Messaging (LFM) [45], small image manipulations
or corruptions would render existing techniques useless, as
their goal is encoding a large number of bits-per-pixel in the
context of perfect digital transmission. HiDDeN introduces
various types of noise between encoding and decoding to
increase robustness but focuses only on the set of corruptions
that would occur through digital image manipulations (e.g.,
JPEG compression and cropping). For use as a physical bar-
code, the decoder cannot assume perfect alignment, given
the perspective shifts and pixel resampling guaranteed to oc-
cur when taking a casual photo. LFM [45] obtain robustness
using a network trained on a large dataset of manually pho-
tographed monitors to undo the camera-display corruptions.
Our method does not require this time-intensive dataset cap-
ture step and generalizes to printed images, a medium for
which collecting training data would be even more difficult.
2.2. Watermarking
Watermarking, a form of steganography, has long been
considered as a potential way to link a physical image
to an Internet resource [2]. Early work in the area de-
fined a set of desirable goals for robust watermarking,
including invisibility and robustness to image manipula-
tions [7]. Later research demonstrated the significant ro-
bustness benefits of encoding the watermark in the log-polar
frequency domain [27, 33, 35, 53]. Similar methods have
been optimized for use as interactive mobile phone appli-
cations [13, 31, 36]. Additional work focuses on carefully
modeling the printer-camera transform [37, 42] or display-
camera transform [17, 46, 50] for better information transfer.
Some approaches to display-camera communication take
advantage of the unique properties of this hardware combi-
nation such as polarization [49], rolling shutter artifacts [26],
or high frame rate [12]. A related line of work in image
forensics explores whether it is possible to use a CNN to
detect when an image has been re-imaged [16]. In contrast
to the hand-designed pipelines used in previous work on
watermarking, our method automatically learns how to hide
and transmit data in a way that is robust to many different
combinations of printers/displays, cameras, lighting, and
viewpoints. We provide a framework for training this system
and a rigorous evaluation of its capabilities, demonstrating
that it works in many real world scenarios and using ablations
to show the relative importance of our training perturbations.
2.3. Barcodes
Barcodes are one of the most popular solutions for trans-
mitting a short string of data to a computing device, requiring
only simple hardware (a laser reader or camera) and an area
for printing or displaying the code. Traditional barcodes are
a one dimensional pattern where bars of alternating thick-
ness encode different values. The ubiquity of high quality
cellphone cameras has led to the frequent use of two dimen-
sional QR codes to transmit data to and from phones. For
example, users can share contact information, pay for goods,
track inventory, or retrieve a coupon from an advertisement.
Past research has addressed the issue of robustly decod-
ing existing or new barcode designs using cameras [29, 32].
Some designs particularly take advantage of the increased
capabilities of cameras beyond simple laser scanners in vari-
ous ways, such as incorporating color into the barcode [8].
Other work has proposed a method that determines where a
barcode should be placed on an image and what color should
be used to improve machine readability [30].
Another special type of barcode is specially designed to
transmit both a small identifier and a precise six degree-of-
freedom orientation for camera localization or calibration,
e.g., ArUco markers [19, 38]. Hu et al. [22] train a deep
network to localize and identify ArUco markers in challeng-
ing real world conditions using data augmentation similarly
to our method. However, their focus is robust detection of
highly visible preexisting markers, as opposed to robust de-
coding of messages hidden in arbitrary natural images.
2.4. Robust Adversarial Image Attacks
Adversarial image attacks on object classification CNNs
are designed to minimally perturb an image in order to pro-
duce an incorrect classification. Most relevant to our work
are the demonstrations of adversarial examples in the physi-
cal world [4, 10, 15, 25, 28, 40, 41], where systems are made
robust for imaging applications by modeling physically real-
istic perturbations (i.e., affine image warping, additive noise,
and JPEG compression). Jan et al. [25] take a different ap-
proach, explicitly training a neural network to replicate the
distortions added by an imaging system and showing that ap-
plying the attack to the distorted image increases the success
rate.
These results demonstrate that networks can still be af-
fected by small perturbations after the image has gone
through an imaging pipeline. Our proposed task shares some
similarities; however, classification targets 1 of n ≈ 210 la-
bels, while we aim to uniquely decode 1 of 2m messages,
Original Image StegaStamp Residual
Figure 2: Examples of encoded images. The residual is calcu-
lated by the encoder network and added back to the original
image to produce the encoded StegaStamp. These examples
have 100 bit encoded messages and are robust to the image
perturbations that occur through the printing and imaging
pipelines.
where m ≈ 100 is the number of encoded bits. Additionally,
adversarial attacks typically do not modify the decoder net-
work, whereas we explicitly train our decoder to cooperate
with our encoder for maximum information transferal.
3. Training for Real World Robustness
During training, we apply a set of differentiable image
perturbations outlined in Figure 3 between the encoder and
decoder to approximate the distortions caused by physically
displaying and imaging the StegaStamps. Previous work
on synthesizing robust adversarial examples used a similar
method to attack classification networks in the wild (termed
“Expectation over Transformation”), though they used a more
limited set of transformations [4]. HiDDeN [54] used non-
spatial perturbations to augment their steganography pipeline
against digital perturbations only. Deep ChArUco [22] used
both spatial and nonspatial perturbations to train a robust
detector specifically for ChArUco fiducial marker boards.
We combine ideas from all of these works, training an en-
coder and decoder that cooperate to robustly transmit hidden
messages through a physical display-imaging pipeline.
Input Perspective warp 
(Sec. 3.1)
Motion/defocus blur 
(Sec. 3.2)
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Noise 
(Sec. 3.4)
JPEG compression 
(Sec. 3.5)
Figure 3: Image perturbation pipeline. During training, we approximate the effects of a physical display-imaging pipeline in
order to make our model robust for use in the real world. We take the output of the encoding network and apply the random
transformations shown here before passing the image through the decoding network (see Section 3 for details).
3.1. Perspective Warp
Assuming a pinhole camera model, any two images of
the same planar surface can be related by a homography. We
generate a random homography to simulate the effect of a
camera that is not precisely aligned with the encoded im-
age marker. To sample a homography, we randomly perturb
the four corner locations of the marker uniformly within a
fixed range (up to ±40 pixels, i.e. ±10%) then solve for the
homography that maps the original corners to their new lo-
cations. We bilinearly resample the original image to create
the perspective warped image.
3.2. Motion and Defocus Blur
Blur can result from both camera motion and inaccurate
autofocus. To simulate motion blur, we sample a random
angle and generate a straight line blur kernel with a width
between 3 and 7 pixels. To simulate misfocus, we use a
Gaussian blur kernel with its standard deviation randomly
sampled between 1 and 3 pixels.
3.3. Color Manipulation
Printers and displays have a limited gamut compared
to the full RGB color space. Cameras modify their output
using exposure settings, white balance, and a color correction
matrix. We approximate these perturbations with a series of
random affine color transformations (constant across the
whole image) as follows:
1. Hue shift: adding a random color offset to each of the
RGB channels sampled uniformly from [−0.1, 0.1].
2. Desaturation: randomly linearly interpolating between
the full RGB image and its grayscale equivalent.
3. Brightness and contrast: affine histogram rescaling
mx+ b with m ∼ U [0.5, 1.5] and b ∼ U [−0.3, 0.3].
After these transforms, we clip the color channels to [0, 1].
3.4. Noise
Noise introduced by camera systems is well studied and
includes photon noise, dark noise, and shot noise [20]. We
assume standard non-photon-starved imaging conditions,
employing a Gaussian noise model (sampling the standard
deviation σ ∼ U [0, 0.2]) to account for imaging noise.
3.5. JPEG Compression
Camera images are usually stored in a lossy format such
as JPEG. JPEG compresses images by computing the dis-
crete cosine transform of each 8× 8 block in the image and
quantizing the resulting coefficients by rounding to the near-
est integer (at varying strengths for different frequencies).
This rounding step is not differentiable, so we use the trick
from Shin and Song [40] for approximating the quantization
step near zero with the piecewise function
q(x) =
{
x3 : |x| < 0.5
x : |x| ≥ 0.5 (1)
which has nonzero derivative almost everywhere. We sample
the JPEG quality uniformly within [50, 100].
4. Implementation Details
4.1. Encoder
The encoder is trained to embed a message into an image
while minimizing perceptual differences between the input
and encoded images. We use a U-Net [39] style architecture
that receives a four channel 400 × 400 pixel input (input
image RGB channels plus one for the message) and outputs
a three channel RGB residual image. The input message is
represented as a 100 bit binary string, processed through a
fully connected layer to form a 50 × 50 × 3 tensor, then
upsampled to produce a 400× 400× 3 tensor. We find that
applying this preprocessing to the message aids convergence.
We present examples of encoded images in Figure 2.
4.2. Decoder
The decoder is a network trained to recover the hidden
message from the encoded image. A spatial transformer
network [24] is used to develop robustness against small
perspective changes that are introduced while capturing and
rectifying the encoded image. The transformed image is fed
through a series of convolutional and dense layers and a
sigmoid to produce a final output with the same length as
the message. The decoder network is supervised using cross
entropy loss.
4.3. Detector
For real world use, we must detect and rectify StegaS-
tamps within a wide field of view image before decod-
ing them, since the decoder network alone is not designed
to handle full detection within a much larger image. We
fine-tune an off-the-shelf semantic segmentation network
BiSeNet [48] to segment areas of the image that are be-
lieved to contain StegaStamps. The network is trained using
a dataset of randomly transformed StegaStamps embedded
into high resolution images sampled from DIV2K [1]. At
test time, we fit a quadrilateral to the convex hull of each of
the network’s proposed regions, then compute a homography
to warp each quadrilateral back to a 400× 400 pixel image
for parsing by the decoder.
4.4. Encoder/Decoder Training Procedure
Training Data During training, we use images from the
MIRFLICKR dataset [23] (resampled to 400× 400 resolu-
tion) combined with randomly sampled binary messages.
Critic As part of our total loss, we use a critic network
that predicts whether a message is encoded in a image and is
used as a perceptual loss for the encoder/decoder pipeline.
The network is composed of a series of convolutional layers
followed by max pooling. To train the critic, an input image
and an encoded image are classified and the Wasserstein
loss [3] is used as a supervisory signal. Training of the critic
is interleaved with the training of the encoder/decoder.
Losses To enforce minimal perceptual distortion on the
encoded StegaStamp, we use an L2 residual regularization
LR, the LPIPS perceptual loss [52] LP , and a critic loss
LC calculated between the encoded image and the original
image. We use cross entropy loss LM for the message. The
training loss is the weighted sum of these loss components.
L = λRLR + λPLP + λCLC + λMLM (2)
We find three loss function adjustments to particularly aid in
convergence when training the networks:
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Figure 4: Examples of our system deployed in-the-wild. We
outline the StegaStamps detected and decoded by our system
and the show message recovery accuracies. Our method
works in the real world, exhibiting robustness to changing
camera orientation, lighting, shadows, etc. You can find these
examples and more in our supplemental video.
1. These image loss weights λR,P,C must initially be set
to zero while the decoder trains to high accuracy, after
which λR,P,C are increased linearly.
2. The image perturbation strengths must also start at zero.
The perspective warping is the most sensitive perturba-
tion and is increased at the slowest rate.
3. The model learns to add distracting patterns at the edge
of the image (perhaps to assist in localization). We
mitigate this effect by increasing the weight of the L2
loss at the edges with a cosine dropoff.
5. Real-World & Simulation-Based Evaluation
We test our system in both real-world conditions and
synthetic approximations of display-imaging pipelines. We
show that our system works in-the-wild, recovering mes-
sages in uncontrolled indoor and outdoor environments. We
evaluate our system in a controlled real world setting with
18 combinations of 6 different displays/printers and 3 differ-
ent cameras. Across all settings combined (1890 captured
99%97% 97%
Figure 5: Despite not explicitly training the method to be
robust to occlusion, we find that our decoder can handle
partial erasures gracefully, maintaining high accuracy.
images), we achieve a mean bit-accuracy of 98.7%. We con-
duct real and synthetic ablation studies with four different
trained models to verify that our system is robust to each of
the perturbations we apply during training and that omitting
these augmentations significantly decreases performance.
5.1. In-the-Wild Robustness
Our method is tested on handheld cellphone camera
videos captured in a variety of real-world environments. The
StegaStamps are printed on a consumer printer. Examples
of the captured frames with detected quadrilaterals and de-
coding accuracy are shown in Figure 4. We also demonstrate
a surprising level of robustness when portions of the Ste-
gaStamp are covered by other objects (Figure 5). Please see
our supplemental video for extensive examples of real world
StegaStamp decoding, including examples of perfectly recov-
ering 56 bit messages using BCH error correcting codes [6].
We generally find that if the bounding rectangle is accurately
located, decoding accuracy is high. However, it is possible
for the detector to miss the StegaStamp on a subset of video
frames. In practice this is not an issue, because the code only
needs to be recovered once. We expect future extensions
that incorporate temporal information and custom detection
networks can further improve the detection consistency.
5.2. Controlled Real World Experiments
In order to demonstrate that our model generalizes from
synthetic perturbations to real physical display-imaging
pipelines, we conduct a series of test where encoded im-
ages are printed or displayed, recaptured by a camera, then
decoded. We randomly select 100 unique images from the
ImageNet dataset [14] (disjoint from our training set) and
embed random 100 bit messages within each image. We gen-
erate 5 additional StegaStamps with the same source image
but different messages for a total of 105 test images. We con-
duct the experiments in a darkroom with fixed lighting. The
printed images are fixed in a rig for consistency and captured
by a tripod-mounted camera. The resulting photographs are
cropped by hand, rectified, and passed through the decoder.
The images are printed using a consumer printer (HP
5th 25th 50th Mean
W
eb
ca
m Pr
in
te
r Enterprise 88% 94% 98% 95.9%
Consumer 90% 98% 99% 98.1%
Pro 97% 99% 100% 99.2%
Sc
re
en Monitor 94% 98% 99% 98.5%
Laptop 97% 99% 100% 99.1%
Cellphone 91% 98% 99% 97.7%
C
el
lp
ho
ne
Pr
in
te
r Enterprise 88% 96% 98% 96.8%
Consumer 95% 99% 100% 99.0%
Pro 97% 99% 100% 99.3%
Sc
re
en Monitor 98% 99% 100% 99.4%
Laptop 98% 99% 100% 99.7%
Cellphone 96% 99% 100% 99.2%
D
SL
R Pr
in
te
r Enterprise 86% 96% 99% 97.0%
Consumer 97% 99% 100% 99.3%
Pro 98% 99% 100% 99.5%
Sc
re
en Monitor 99% 100% 100% 99.8%
Laptop 99% 100% 100% 99.8%
Cellphone 99% 100% 100% 99.8%
Table 1: Real world decoding accuracy (percentage of bits
correctly recovered) tested using a combination of six display
methods (three printers and three screens) and three cameras.
We show the 5th, 25th, and 50th percentiles and mean taken
over 105 images chosen randomly from ImageNet [14] with
randomly sampled 100 bit messages.
LaserJet Pro M281fdw), an enterprise printer (HP LaserJet
Enterprise CP4025), and a commercial printer (Xerox 700i
Digital Color Press). The images are also digitally displayed
on a matte 1080p monitor (Dell ST2410), a glossy high
DPI laptop screen (Macbook Pro 15 inch), and an OLED
cellphone screen (iPhone X). To image the StegaStamps, we
use an HD webcam (Logitech C920), a cellphone camera
(Google Pixel 3), and a DSLR camera (Canon 5D Mark II).
All devices use their factory calibration settings. Each of the
105 images were captured across all 18 combinations of the
6 media and 3 cameras. The results are reported in Table 1.
Our method is highly robust across a variety of different
combinations of display/printer and camera; two-thirds of
these scenarios yield a median accuracy of 100% and a 5th
percentile accuracy of at least 95% perfect decoding. Our
mean accuracy over all 1890 captured images is 98.7%.
Using a test set comprised of the cellphone camera +
consumer printer combination, we compare variants of our
method (described further in Section 5.3) to Baluja [5], HiD-
DeN [54], and LFM [44] in Figure 6. The variants of our
model use the same architecture but are trained with different
augmentations; the names None, Pixelwise, Spatial, and All
indicate which categories of peturbations were applied dur-
ing training. We see that Baluja [5], trained with a minimal
amount of augmented noise (similar to our None variant)
performs no better than guessing. HiDDeN [54] incorporates
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Figure 6: Real world comparisons of variants of our method
described in Section 5.3 and competing methods, using the
cellphone camera + consumer printer pipeline from Table 1.
We show the distribution of random guessing (with its mean
of 0.5 indicated by the dotted line) to demonstrate that the no-
perturbations ablation and Baluja [5] perform no better than
chance. HiDDeN [54] uses pixelwise perturbations along
with random masking. Adding spatial perturbations is critical
for achieving high real-world performance. LFM [44] works
well on screens but fails to generalize to printed media.
augmentations into their training pipeline to increase robust-
ness to perturbations. Their method is trained with a set of
pixelwise perturbations along with a “cropping” augmen-
tation that masks out a random image region. However, it
lacks augmentations that spatially resample the image, and
we find that its accuracy falls between our Pixelwise and
Spatial variants. LFM [44] specifically trains a “distortion”
network to mimic the effect of displaying and recapturing
an encoded image, trained on a dataset they collect of over 1
million images from 25 display/camera pairs. In this domain
(“screen”), we find LFM performs fairly well. However, it
does not generalize to printer/camera pipelines (“printer”).
Please refer to the supplement for testing details regarding
the compared methods. Among our own ablated variants,
we see that training with spatial perturbations alone yields
significantly higher performance than only using pixelwise
perturbations; however, Spatial still does not reliably recover
enough data for practical use. Our presented method (All),
combining both pixelwise and spatial perturbations, achieves
the most precise and accurate results by a large margin.
5.3. Synthetic Ablation Test
We test how training with different subsets of the image
perturbations from Section 3 impacts decoding accuracy in a
synthetic experiment (Figure 7). We evaluate both our base
model (trained with all perturbations) and three additional
Message length
Metric 50 100 150 200
PSNR ↑ 29.88 28.50 26.47 21.79
SSIM ↑ 0.930 0.905 0.876 0.793
LPIPS ↓ 0.100 0.101 0.128 0.184
Table 2: Image quality for models trained with different
message lengths, averaged over 500 images. For PSNR and
SSIM, higher is better. LPIPS [52] is a learned perceptual
similarity metric, lower is better.
models (trained with no perturbations, only pixelwise per-
turbations, and only spatial perturbations). Most work on
learned image steganography focuses on hiding as much
information as possible, assuming that no corruption will
occur prior to decoding (as in our “no perturbations” model).
We run a more exhaustive synthetic ablation study over
1000 images to separately test the effects of each training-
time perturbation on accuracy. The results shown in Figure 7
follow a similar pattern to the real world comparison test.
The model trained with no perturbations is surprisingly ro-
bust to color warps and noise but immediately fails in the
presence of warp, blur, or any level of JPEG compression.
Training with only pixelwise perturbations yields high ro-
bustness to those augmentations but still leaves the network
vulnerable to any amount of pixel resampling from warping
or blur. On the other hand, training with only spatial per-
turbations also confers increased robustness against JPEG
compression (perhaps because it has a similar low-pass fil-
tering effect to blurring). Again, training with both spatial
and pixelwise augmentations yields the best result.
5.4. Practical Message Length
Our model can be trained to store different numbers of
bits. In all previous examples, we use a message length of
100. Figure 8 compares encoded images from four separately
trained models with different message lengths. Larger mes-
sage are more difficult to encode and decode; as a result,
there is a trade off between recovery accuracy and percep-
tual similarity. The associated image metrics are reported in
Table 2. When training, the image and message losses are
tuned such that the bit accuracy converges to at least 95%.
We settle on a message length of 100 bits as it provides a
good compromise between image quality and information
transfer. Given an estimate of at least 95% recovery accuracy,
we can encode at least 56 error corrected bits using BCH
codes [6]. As discussed in the introduction, this gives us the
ability to uniquely map every recorded image in history to a
corresponding StegaStamp. Accounting for error correcting,
using only 50 total message bits would drastically reduce the
number of possible encoded hyperlinks to under one billion.
The image degradation caused by encoding 150 or 200 bits
is much more perceptible.
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Figure 7: Synthetic ablation tests showing the effect of training with various image perturbation combinations on bit recovery
robustness. “Pixelwise” perturbations (c) are noise, color transforms, and JPEG compression, and “spatial” perturbations (d)
are perspective warp and blur. To test robustness across a range of possible degradation, we parameterize the strength of each
perturbation on a scale from 0 (weakest) to 1 (maximum value seen during training) to 2 (strongest). Models not trained against
spatial perturbations (b-c) are highly susceptible to warp and blur, and the model trained only on spatial perturbations (d) is
sensitive to color transformations. The lines show the mean accuracies and the shaded regions shows the 25th-75th percentile
range over 100 random images and messages. See Section 5.3 for details.
50 bits 100 bits 150 bits 200 bitsOriginal
Figure 8: Four models trained to encode messages of different lengths. The inset shows the residual relative to the original
image. The perceptual quality decreases as more bits are encoded. We find that a message length of 100 bits provides good
image quality and is sufficient to encode a virtually unlimited number of distinct hyperlinks using error correcting codes.
5.5. Limitations
Though our system works with a high rate of success in
the real world, it is still many steps from enabling broad de-
ployment. Despite often being very subtle in high frequency
textures, the residual added by the encoder network is some-
times perceptible in large low frequency regions of the image.
Future work could improve upon our architecture and loss
functions to generate more subtle encodings.
Additionally, we find our off-the-shelf detection network
to be the bottleneck in our decoding performance during real
world testing. A custom detection architecture optimized end
to end with the encoder/decoder could increase detection
performance. The current framework also assumes that the
StegaStamps will be single, square images for the purpose
of detection. We imagine that embedding multiple codes
seamlessly into a single, larger image (such as a poster or
billboard) could provide even more flexibility.
6. Conclusion
We have presented an end-to-end deep learning frame-
work for encoding 56 bit error corrected hyperlinks into
arbitrary natural images. Our networks are trained through
an image perturbation module that allows them to generalize
to real world display-imaging pipelines. We demonstrate
robust decoding performance on a variety of printer, screen,
and camera combinations in an experimental setting. We
also show that our method is stable enough to be deployed
in-the-wild as a replacement for existing barcodes that is less
intrusive and more aesthetically pleasing.
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A. StegaStamp Examples
See Figure 9 for additional examples of encoded images
and their residuals.
B. Supplemental Videos
https://youtu.be/E8OqgNDBGO0
This video provides an overview of StegaStamps with
example use cases and a condensed demonstration of
in-the-wild results.
https://youtu.be/jpbRhOH3D9Y
This video is a compilation of multiple in-the-wild cap-
tures. The first set of clips visualizes the output bounding
polygons along with the percentage of bits recovered cor-
rectly out of 100. We filter the output to only show detections
where the bit accuracy is greater than 70 percent. We note
that the messages are regularly recovered with greater than
90% accuracy when they are properly detected. The second
set of clips demonstrates the used of BCH error correction [6]
to robustly detect and correct recovered codes. The transmit-
ted data consists of 56 message bits and 40 error correcting
bits. When the accuracy is greater than 95% (fewer than 5
corrupted bits), the original 56-bit message can be recovered
exactly. If too many bits are corrupted, the error correcting
fails and we filter out the proposal. The video represents
successfully decoded StegaStamps with green polygons. The
decoded code is printed above the polygon. Note that for
most real world applications, it is only necessary to recover
the code in a single video frame to count it as successfully
scanned.
C. Comparison Details
We compare our method to Baluja [5], HiDDeN [54],
and LFM [44]. Baluja was designed to hide images within
images, which differs from our task of hiding a bitstring
within an image. To account for this, we convert our 100 bit
message into a 10×10 grid of ones and zeros that is upscaled
to the resolution of the cover image. During decoding we
round the model output to 0 and 1 and take the mode within
each upscaled block. As the original model was trained to
hide natural images, we retrain the model from scratch to
hide our bitstring grids.
HiDDeN was trained to hide 30 bit messages in 128×128
pixel images. We observed a significant drop in accuracy
when we trained a model to hide 100 bit messages in 400
pixel images, therefore we report accuracy results on the 30
bit in 1282 image version.
LFM [44] was trained to encode 1024 bit messages as
4 × 4 pixel blocks in a 256 × 256 pixel image. To encode
our 100 bit message, we allocated 9 blocks for each message
bit (we therefore only use a 244 × 244 pixel subset of the
Mean Acc. ↑ bits/MP ↑
Baluja [5] 0.51 0.5
HiDDeN [54] 0.65 125
LFM [44] (printed) 0.61 287
LFM [44] (screen) 0.93 1109
O
ur
s
None 0.49 0.1
Pixelwise 0.51 0.2
Spatial 0.89 318
All 0.99 571
Table 3: Quantitative comparison of other methods and
our ablations. We show numbers in terms of fraction of
bits correctly recovered (mean accuracy) as well as bits-
per-megapixel (bits/MP). Higher is better for both metrics.
The bits/MP metric normalizes the message length and im-
age sizes between different methods. All methods except
“LFM [44] (screen)” (cellphone camera/cellphone screen) are
reported on the cellphone camera/consumer printer pipeline.
We report LFM’s results in this additional case because it
was explicitly designed for screen/camera transmission.
PSNR ↑ SSIM ↑ LPIPS ↓
Baluja [5] 24.61 0.926 0.256
HiDDeN [54] (native) 31.07 0.940 0.070
HiDDeN [54] 24.55 0.775 0.202
LFM [44] 20.89 0.910 0.315
Ours 27.25 0.927 0.194
Table 4: Quantitative comparison of encoded image quality,
indicating how well hidden the message is. For HiDDeN [54]
we show both the metrics for the original lower resolution
(native 128× 128) and upsampling to our compared resolu-
tion of 400× 400 with bicubic interpolation. At full resolu-
tion, our method produces an encoded image most similar to
the original in all metrics.
image). We average and round the 9 block predictions to
recover the message bit.
Each compared method encodes a different length mes-
sage into a different size image. However, if we treat the
mean bit recovery accuracy (first column in Table 3) as the
crossover probability p in a binary symmetric channel, we
can use information theory to calculate the channel capacity
(with unit “bits”):
C(p) = 1− (−p log2 p− (1− p) log2 1− p) (3)
If we divide C(p) by the number of pixels Npix in the orig-
inal image, we get the expected number of bits-per-pixel
transmitted by that method. Multiplying C(p)Npix by 10
6 yields
our bits-per-megapixel metric in the second column of Ta-
ble 3.
Original StegaStamp ResidualOriginal StegaStamp ResidualOriginal StegaStamp Residual
Figure 9: Additional examples of encoded images and their residuals.
D. Architecture Details
Network architectures for our encoder (Table 5) and de-
coder (Table 6). Our detector uses the BiSeNet [48] architec-
ture.
E. Code
The code and pretrained networks can be found at
https://github.com/tancik/StegaStamp.
Layer k s chns in out input
inputs 6 image + secret
conv1 3 1 6/32 1 1 inputs
conv2 3 2 32/32 1 2 conv1
conv3 3 2 32/64 2 4 conv2
conv4 3 2 64/128 4 8 conv3
conv5 3 2 128/256 8 16 conv4
up6 2 1 256/128 16 8 upsample(conv5)
conv6 3 1 256/128 8 8 conv4 + up6
up7 2 1 128/64 8 4 upsample(conv6)
conv7 3 1 128/64 4 4 conv3 + up7
up8 2 1 64/32 4 2 upsample(conv7)
conv8 3 1 64/32 2 2 conv2 + up8
up9 2 1 32/32 2 1 upsample(conv8)
conv9 3 1 70/32 1 1 conv1 + up9 + inputs
conv10 3 1 32/32 1 1 conv9
residual 1 1 32/3 1 1 conv10
Table 5: Our encoder network architecture. k is the kernel
size, s the stride, chns the number of input and output chan-
nels for each layer, in and out are the accumulated stride for
the input and output of each layer, input denotes the input
of each layer with + meaning concatenation and “upsample”
performing 2× nearest neighbor upsampling. A ReLU is
applied after each layer except the last.
Layer k s chns in out input
conv1 3 2 3/32 1 2 image
conv2 3 2 32/64 2 4 conv1
conv3 3 2 64/128 4 8 conv2
fc0 320000 flatten(conv3)
fc1 320000/128 fc0
fc2 128/6 fc1
image warped 3/3 transf(image, fc2)
conv1 3 2 3/32 1 2 image warped
conv2 3 1 32/32 2 2 conv1
conv3 3 2 32/64 2 4 conv2
conv4 3 1 64/64 4 4 conv3
conv5 3 2 64/64 4 8 conv4
conv6 3 2 64/128 8 16 conv5
conv7 3 2 128/128 16 32 conv6
fc0 20000 flatten(conv7)
fc1 20000/512 fc0
secret 512/100 fc1
Table 6: Our decoder network architecture. We indicate con-
volutional layers with the prefix “conv” and fully connected
layers with the prefix “fc.” The first half of the network
outputs an affine warp that is applied using a differentiable
spatial transformer layer (“transf”). The warped result is fed
into the second part of the network. A ReLU is applied after
each layer except the last layer before the spatial transformer.
